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  It is almost impossible to overstate the importance of trade to US agriculture.  For 
one thing, these markets are large and growing—FAS says they will reach $77 billion in 
sales for 2007.  And, for several major commodities, export markets are even more 
important than indicated by raw sales numbers.  For cotton, wheat and rice, for example, 
the export share is very large—70% for cotton during 2002-05, and 50% and 52%, 
respectively, for wheat and rice.  Many other products also depend heavily on export 
markets, although their shares are smaller.  While bulk commodity exports have grown 
only sporadically in recent years, they remain highly important. 
  Trade and access to international markets for bulk commodities have long been 
closely linked to US domestic policies, which were substantially re-structured in the mid-
1980s after US global market shares of those commodities declined.  International market 
competitiveness was regained quickly then, using both export subsidies (modestly) and 
marketing loans (primarily).  Bulk commodity exports certainly would be much lower 
than they are today had not the policy shifts of the mid-1980s taken place.   
  However, US exports have never been entirely bulk commodities and the policy 
linkage for other agricultural products exported is much less direct.  For example, in 
recent years, the importance of exports of consumer-ready products (fruits, vegetables, The Doha Round:  The US Perspective  2
red meats, among others) has increased sharply and persistently (Chart 1).  Exports of 
intermediate, partially processed products also have grown modestly but steadily.   
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  Today, once again, there are growing concerns that US commodities—especially 
basic commodities supported by safety net programs—are losing competitiveness.  In 
some cases, such as for soybeans, US market shares have declined as competitors invest 
in both increases in area and yields.  As a result, the US share of global soybean markets 
has declined steadily from above 50% in the mid-1990s.  And, that trend could be 
amplified in the future as the growth of US renewable fuel markets stimulates the demand 
for acreage, primarily for corn.  Acreage shifts from oilseeds and other crops to corn are 
expected to continue to boost commodity prices over the intermediate term, and could 
reduce the competitiveness of many US products in world markets.     The Doha Round:  The US Perspective  3
  However, these trends require careful interpretation.  In recent months, the 
outlook for US corn has changed almost daily as new ethanol facilities come on line.  For 
some producers, the growth of the renewable fuels markets has meant far less interest in 
export markets (and, in trade agreements) than before, and some experts interpret this as a 
decline in the importance of trade.   
  However, US trade interests are much broader than that, even for the bulk 
commodities.  For example, Informa projections suggest that if the US produces about 15 
billion gallons of renewable fuels 2015—well above the current mandate—that market 
will account for 5.2 billion bushels of a 14.5 billion crop—about 36%.  Feed use could be 
about 6 billion bushels, a little less than in 2006.  Exports could be 1.9 billion bushels, 
down from 2.1 billion bushels in 2006, but still important. 
  Thus, the emerging trends may make major US commodities less competitive in 
foreign markets, but they are unlikely to mean that the United States will be a net 
importer of corn or soybeans by 2015 (as some have suggested). 
  Much depends on timing.  If investment in ethanol production is faster than 
projected, pressure on production resources could grow—and, US exports could become 
less competitive than anticipated.  If renewable fuel markets grow more slowly than 
expected, or more erratically, pressure on resources and prices could be less than now 
anticipated. 
  In any event, the expected fundamental changes in US markets do not mean the 
end of US interest in trade, or in the Doha Round.  In fact, many of the rapidly-growing 
consumer ready products such as meats, dairy products and fruits and vegetables now 
face very high tariffs and have an important stake in the success of the Doha Round. The Doha Round:  The US Perspective  4
US Support For an Agreement 
  Actually, political support for trade liberalization among bulk commodity 
producers began to decline some time ago—perhaps in the 1990s—as some producers 
came to believe that they had been oversold on the benefits of the Uruguay Agreement.  
However, not all US producers evaluate the potential for the growth of export markets, or 
of the benefits of trade agreements the same way.   
  For example, producers of consumer-ready products have been able to increase 
sales rapidly, in spite of relatively high barriers to several important markets.  These 
production systems tend to be much more intensive and less affected by the growing 
competition for US resources than are bulk commodities.  For these already competitive 
products, a strong Doha agreement would mean improved terms of trade and access to 
much wider world markets—and, potentially significantly stronger future sales.   
  In addition, the complexity of US export markets long has posed an important 
dilemma for policy makers.  While the United States has many objectives in the Round, 
one major ambition is to gain concessions in terms of market access that significantly 
exceed the concessions it may be required to make concerning its domestic supports.  
  However, this is a difficult deal to sell to many producer groups, at least in part 
because those who face potential reductions in their current domestic support programs—
producers of program commodities—are different from those who would expect to 
benefit the most in terms of greater market access—producers of consumer-ready 
products.   
  And, since the groups that could face the loss of domestic supports tend to be 
more highly organized and politically powerful than at least some of those who stand to The Doha Round:  The US Perspective  5
gain most from the negotiations, it has been hard for the United States to develop a 
negotiating position for the Round that would lead to an agreement, and that it can expect 
to sell to the Congress. 
  Two major developments appear to have the potential to affect this situation.  The 
first is that the fact that the exploding renewable fuels markets are reducing the 
attractiveness of current programs to at least some basic commodity producers—and, 
CBO’s recent projections of future program spending under current programs reflect that 
prospect.  As a result, producers of program commodities are struggling with the question 
of how valuable protections against low prices may be in the future when their risks may 
come more from price volatility rather than persistent low levels.  This change could 
reduce the perceived political cost of shifting the structure of US domestic supports from 
largely amber box to largely green—although, recent discussions suggest that producer 
groups are far from convinced that persistent low prices will not return in the future.  The 
administration’s 2007 farm bill proposal suggests that such policies are receiving serious 
consideration. 
  The second development is the growing threat of WTO litigation, following the 
Brazilian cotton case and the emerging Canadian corn case.  The results of this—and, 
other—litigation could mean major structural changes or even the termination of 
important safety net programs without concessions in return from trading partners.  
Producer groups now appear far from convinced of the importance or immediacy of these 
threats, but the administration clearly is and says it is willing to consider new concessions 
to trading partners in return for increased market access and protection from future 
litigation. The Doha Round:  The US Perspective  6
  In a negative way, US interest in a strong agreement reflects interest in capturing 
progress already made, but which would be lost if the Round fails.  This includes 
agreement to terminate export subsidies, which would end in 2013—an objective trading 
partners have been working toward for more than three decades.  However, it is the area 
of market access where an agreement would bring the most benefits.  There now is 
agreement on the structure of the cuts, but not on the specific requirements or on the issue 
of special treatment for sensitive products for both developed and developing countries.  
  Considerable discussion has focused on domestic supports, and especially the 
disparity between the US and EU as the EU has moved to reform the CAP.  At the same 
time, the United States continues to express willingness to consider converting a number 
of its amber-box programs to green.   
  In addition, complete failure of the Round would mean a number of negative 
developments for the United States.  It is likely that further progress toward global trade 
reform would be delayed substantially, perhaps for a generation or more as political 
criticism of globalization intensifies.  The result could be a severe erosion of the WTO—
and, perhaps its demise.  The system is fragile already but is increasingly important now 
to deal with the newly emerging SPS challenges, among others.  One result would be that 
dispute resolution efforts would be called into question and possibly ignored. 
  More fundamental would be a widening disparity in growth rates/incomes 
between rich and poor countries.  In today’s world, it has become increasingly clear that 
economic and income growth are closely tied to market openness.  In the absence of the 
WTO levers for better policies, the poorest nations can be expected to fall farther behind, 
exacerbating old geopolitical problems.   The Doha Round:  The US Perspective  7
  In such a setting, preferential trade agreements can be expected to continue and to 
assume more urgency, but also to become more political, less rigorous and   
comprehensive as more sensitive sectors and products are omitted.  As world trade rules 
reflect an increasingly patchwork pattern, LDCs could be increasingly left out since they 
tend not to be attractive partners.  The result of such trends could be growing trade 
tensions, regional instability, and greater focus on trade displacement that focuses simply 
on different size slices rather than creating a larger pie. 
What would a Doha agreement mean for the United States? 
  Thus, a strong Doha agreement continues to be important for the United States in 
spite of its growing renewable fuels markets.  Key impacts include: 
•  To craft an agreement that could pass the congress likely would require a deal that 
would increase US market access more than it would require in concessions on 
domestic supports, and would imply major benefits for both consumer-ready and 
intermediate products, areas in which the United States can be expected to continue to 
be highly competitive—and, which are less affected by the domestic US competition 
for resources to produce renewable fuels.  For these competitive products, better 
market access likely would translate directly into increased investment and greater 
future sales. 
•  At the same time, an agreement would be expected to have benefits for bulk 
commodities as well in the form of protection against WTO litigation.  This assumes 
that in the process of developing an offer that could lead to an agreement, the United 
States would build upon the current administration farm bill proposal and develop an The Doha Round:  The US Perspective  8
enhanced, green-box safety net that would be “beyond challenge” as Secretary 
Johanns has been suggesting. 
•  To the extent that such an agreement would stimulate production and export of value-
added products, it would be expected to have a significant, beneficial impact on the 
US agricultural sector as a whole.  By stimulating investment and growth of products 
which have the most rapidly growing markets, sector returns would expect to be 
enhanced over the longer run. 
 
 